Trading for an NBA superstar is dearer than ever. Not way back, teams could deal for All-Stars without giving up any future draft picks, or simply one at essentially the most. Now, every major transaction involves a pick bonanza.
But NBA teams are limited of their creativity when trading picks. They will’t trade conditional picks like NFL teams. They will’t trade first-round picks in consecutive seasons, because of the Stepien Rule from the Eighties. They will’t trade picks greater than seven years into the longer term.
So when general managers seek more flexibility as they throw an increasing number of assets into trades for superstars, they’ve increasingly turned to certainly one of the avenues they’re allowed to explore: pick swaps.
The Anthony Davis trade gave the Pelicans swap rights with the Lakers within the 2023 first round. The Paul George and Jrue Holiday trades gave the Thunder and Pelicans, respectively, two future swap opportunities. The James Harden trade gave the Rockets 4 possible swaps. And just this summer, three more blockbuster deals got here with swap rights attached: one for the Spurs for Dejounte Murray, one for the Jazz for Rudy Gobert, and two more for the Jazz for Donovan Mitchell.
Here’s one solution to quantify the unprecedented variety of pick swaps flying across the league: It’s only 2022, and teams have already committed to offering more first-round swaps within the 2020s than in any previous decade.
But how precious is a pick swap? To reply that query, we surveyed every first-round swap in NBA history, based on the Pro Sports Transactions archives. We recorded whether the swap was exercised, and if that’s the case, how much value the exercising team gained by exchanging picks, using Kevin Pelton’s calculations of pick values as a benchmark.
The outcomes suggest that pick swaps aren’t anywhere near as necessary as they might sound. Historically, a first-round pick swap has been only about as precious because the no. 36 overall pick. That’s value repeating: The common first-round pick swap returns second-round value! And several other team executives agree that—throughout the league itself, and particularly in the general public view—swaps are overvalued in a trade for a star.
The Celtics last decade provided a proof of concept for the perfect consequence of a swap, from the receiving team’s perspective. The 2016-17 Nets had the worst record within the league and won the lottery, while the Celtics had the perfect record within the Eastern Conference and were slated for the no. 27 pick within the draft. But because of swap rights they received within the Paul Pierce–Kevin Garnett trade 4 years earlier, the Celtics were capable of take that no. 1 pick for themselves while the Nets slid to twenty seventh. After a pre-draft trade for the no. 3 pick—which belonged to the 76ers because of a pick swap with the Kings—Boston added Jayson Tatum to a team that had just reached the conference finals.
While that consequence is the dream for any team acquiring swap rights, it’s removed from the norm. Consider what happened the primary time on record that a team traded swap rights. In October 1980, fresh off a championship, the Lakers gave Portland the choice to swap first-rounders in 1984, in exchange for a journeyman big named Jim Brewer. As an instance just how much trade valuations have modified over time, the Lakers hoped Brewer would address “their need for an additional backup center and power forward,” the Los Angeles Times observed on the time of the deal. Imagine the uproar if, say, the Bucks had traded a future swap for Serge Ibaka last season.
Regardless that Brewer averaged only 2.6 points per game over two seasons in Los Angeles, the Lakers didn’t rue the swap they’d surrendered. They were higher than the Trail Blazers in 1984, in order that they had a worse first-round pick and Portland didn’t exercise the swap. (As an alternative, the Blazers got the Lakers’ pick near the tip of the second round.)
This instance provides a far more typical consequence. Out of 31 times through the 2022 draft that a team could have swapped a first-rounder, it did so on only 12 occasions. Which means in 61 percent of the league’s possible swaps to this point, the swap ended up being value nothing.
(Note that three of the 19 swaps to this point that weren’t exercised had pick protections that interfered. Most recently, Oklahoma City had top-four-protected swap rights with Houston in 2021 as a part of the Russell Westbrook–Chris Paul trade. However the Rockets enjoyed lottery luck and landed the no. 2 pick, so the Thunder couldn’t execute. Yet even excluding those swaps barely changes the general results. Protections aren’t the rationale that swaps haven’t been historically precious.)
What about those 12 exercised swaps? Many provided only a smidgeon of value for the team that was capable of jump to a greater pick, like a move from twentieth to 18th, or seventeenth to fifteenth, or twenty sixth to 18th. Some swaps—the Celtics-Nets exchange most of all—were far more precious. But those were few and much between.
So overall, accounting for the swaps that weren’t exercised and the boosts in draft position for people who were, we are able to calculate that the typical pick swap yields about as much value as the typical no. 36 pick within the draft. That’s 20 percent the worth of a mean first-rounder—a large difference in trade price between swap rights and an unprotected pick.
(Salt City Hoops’ Ken Clayton recently checked out a smaller subset of recent swaps and calculated that they’re value a few third of the typical first-round pick—so a bit greater than my results show, but in a similarly underwhelming ballpark.)
A number of aspects help explain why swaps often don’t fulfill teams’ lofty ambitions. First, it’s value emphasizing again that swaps aren’t often exercised in any respect. The teams trading swap rights are generally contending, while the teams grabbing swap rights are generally rebuilding, so the chances are that the previous would finish with a greater record, and thus a worse draft pick, than the latter.
One in every of the swap options that Houston landed in its trade of Harden to the Nets, as an example, was in 2021—the identical yr that the deal happened. There was no probability that Brooklyn would have had a greater draft pick than Houston that summer.
Acquiring teams due to this fact attempt to push their swaps farther into the longer term, when the present contenders might now not be near the highest of the standings. The three swap options Utah grabbed this summer are in 2026 (from Minnesota), 2026 (from Cleveland), and 2028 (Cleveland). It’s almost unattainable to predict team quality beyond a yr or two—fewer than half of 50-win teams are still that good three years later—so it’s possible that Utah will enjoy one other Nets/Celtics switcheroo later this decade.
But even then, it’s not going that a swap will occur. There’s only a 50 percent probability that any random team will finish with a greater draft spot than some other random team, so even in a best-case, long-term scenario, teams should count on gaining precisely zero value from a swap half the time.
Just take a look at the swaps up next summer: Within the 2023 draft, the Thunder can swap picks with the Clippers, which is unlikely. The Rockets can swap with the Nets, which can also be unlikely, unless the Nets completely implode and the Rockets overperform. The Pelicans swapping with the Lakers, alternatively, is more possible.
Furthermore, even the swaps which can be exercised have trouble generating tremendous value. That’s since the top of the draft is so far more impactful than the remaining. In keeping with Pelton’s draft chart, the gap from pick no. 1 to choose no. 5 is about as large because the gap from pick 5 to choose 30. The gap between pick 1 and pick 7 is about as large because the gap between pick 7 and pick 60.
To recoup real value from a swap requires moving as much as the highest of the draft—and that’s extremely rare. Only twice has a team used a swap to maneuver into the highest five. One was the Nets’ transfer to the Celtics in 2017. The opposite involved a Hall of Famer, as a swap allowed the SuperSonics to leap from the 18th pick within the 1987 draft to no. 5. Having fallen to no. 18, the Knicks took Mark Jackson; at no. 5, Seattle chosen Scottie Pippen and traded him to the Bulls for a package that included, incidentally, a future swap.
The Knicks were also on the losing end of the third-most-impactful pick swap in league history. In 2007, the Bulls jumped to no. 9 while the Knicks fell to no. 23 as a part of the Eddy Curry trade, which is how Chicago ended up drafting Joakim Noah.
(OK, there’s yet another swap value mentioning with the Knicks. The long tail of the Carmelo Anthony blockbuster continued through the 2016 draft, when the Nuggets exercised swap rights to take the no. 7 pick while the Knicks landed no. 9. There’s scarcely any difference in expected value between the typical no. 7 and no. 9 picks, so this shouldn’t have been an enormous deal. However the Nuggets drafted Jamal Murray, while the Knicks—well, they didn’t draft anyone at no. 9, because they owed a 2016 first-rounder to Toronto as a part of the Andrea Bargnani trade.)
Still, that makes for under 3 times out of 31 that a swap gave a team the equivalent of a top-20 pick or higher, using Pelton’s values as a baseline.
Exercised First-Round Pick Swaps
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And eventually, it’s necessary to do not forget that unlike with most pick trades, the team receiving the swap isn’t actually gaining an additional selection. Within the Kings-76ers swap in 2017, Philadelphia merely jumped from no. 5 to no. 3. As that chart shows, the difference in expected value between picks 3 and 5 is about equivalent in value to the no. 30 pick, and no person should get too enthusiastic about what is basically adding a late first-rounder.
So if swaps so often underwhelm, why have rebuilding teams sought them with increasing frequency in recent seasons? This shift is partly out of necessity, as the price for stars skyrockets on the trade market. Within the Mitchell trade, the Cavaliers agreed to provide Utah their unprotected picks in 2025, 2027, and 2029, but due to aforementioned Stepien Rule, they couldn’t add actual picks in 2026 or 2028. They might only offer swaps for those in-between years.
Yet team executives also suggest that the league at large is overvaluing swaps because they provide the tantalizing glimmer of upside. One lead analyst compares swaps to the draft lottery itself—any individual tanking team probably won’t land the no. 1 pick, but it may well still dream of that consequence. If a team adds a bunch of swap options—just like the Rockets did in a single big trade, or the Jazz did in separate transactions—then it increases the chances that at the very least certainly one of them will hit big, just like the Celtics did in 2017.
But as history demonstrates, that type of jump requires an actual outlier set of circumstances. Teams will likely keep trading stars for swap rights because the 2020s proceed, but most of the time, those swaps will fade without much impact.